Order is Not Appealable Merely Because it Contains Language or Reasoning that a Party Deems Adverse to its Interests

On April 30, 2014, the Second Department issued a decision in George Tsunis Real Estate, Inc. v. Benedict, 2014 NY Slip Op. 02899, discussing types of orders that are not interlocutorily appealable.

In George Tsunis Real Estate, the plaintiff and defendant both appealed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Second Department dismissed the defendant's appeal, explaining:

The appeal from so much of the order as, in effect, denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability must be dismissed, as the defendants are not aggrieved by that portion of the order (see CPLR 5511). Contrary to the defendants' contention, the order did not grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, but determined that, although the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. To the extent the defendants seek to appeal from the finding that the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, merely because the order appealed from contains language or reasoning that a party deems adverse to its interests does not furnish a basis for standing to take an appeal.

The appeal from so much of the order as denied that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was to preclude the plaintiff from offering certain evidence at the time of trial must be dismissed because it concerns an evidentiary ruling, which, even when made in advance of a hearing or trial on motion papers, is not appealable as of right or by permission.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

This decision shows that, as broad as the right to take an interlocutory appeal is in New York, it is not unlimited.